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Abstract
This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emis-
sions trading in a two-sector (clean and dirty) economy. We compare the welfare implica-
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nd unambiguously more clean rms in the long run under
credit trading. However, neither emissions trading conguration creates the rst-best out-
come: there are too few (many) clean rms under permit (credit) trading. Permit trading
dominates credit trading in terms of overall welfare at the long run equilibrium, except
when policy is relatively lenient. It is also demonstrated that stricter policy does not
necessarily induce the clean sector to grow relative to the dirty sector and we determine
under what conditions this holds.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide, governmental authorities increasingly embark upon trading schemes to e¢ ciently
curtail environmental pollution. This paper analyzes and compares the two main market
congurations for organizing trade in emission allowances: cap-and-trade versus intensity-
based trading. Although tradable pollution markets have been studied extensively in recent
years, a systematic comparison between these pollution market designs in an imperfectly
competitive multi-sector model is still lacking. The aim of this paper is to ll this gap.
Since polluting industries are often concentrated in nature, we allow rms to strategically
interact in an imperfectly competitive output market and assess the sectoral implications of
these policies in the long run equilibrium. The specic question we address in this paper
is to what extent permit and credit trading schemes impact on the intersectoral out-of-
equilibrium dynamics (cleanvs. dirty) in the short run and the corresponding equilibrium
in the long run. Analyzing the interaction between emissions trading and output market
e¤ects is an important dimension in policy assessments, since it is often not optimal to
completely eliminate the pollution intensive (dirty) sector, even though reducing pollution is
the underlying policy goal.
Cap-and-trade (permit trading hereafter) and intensity-based emissions trading (credit
trading hereafter) represent schemes that are based on an absolute cap on emissions and
on relative emission intensities, respectively.1 Whereas under permit trading the control
authority xes the total supply of emissions, in case of credit trading the authority imposes a
source-specic level of emissions abatement, implying a xed average emissions intensity (e.g.,
Tietenberg, 1999). Prime examples of permit trading schemes in the U.S. are the acid rain
programme, which started in 1995, and the RECLAIM programme to cut back sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen oxide emissions from stationary sources in the Los Angeles basin implemented
in 1994. The European counterpart of large scale permit trading currently occurs within the
European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) for carbon dioxide emissions. In the
1980s, U.S. policy also experimented with credit trading arrangements between reneries as
part of the lead phasedown (see, e.g., Hahn and Hester, 1989).2 In Canada a credit trading
system was launched in 1996 under the Pilot Emission Reduction Target and is currently one
of the main design features of Canadas climate policy (Environment Canada, 2007). Also
for developing countries intensity targets have been suggested (e.g., Philibert and Pershing,
2001; Michaelowa, 2005), which will likely be one of the subjects in the upcoming post-Kyoto
emissions trading design debate.
We show that (strategic) competition in the output market is a prime factor in the inter-
play between sectoral choice, production and emissions trading. The interaction in the output
and permit market in the short run, and the corresponding sectoral equilibrium distribution
1Di¤erent labels are used in the literature for the two schemes. Cap-and-trade schemes are also referred to
as allowance or permit trading; intensity-based schemes are also called credit trading, tradable performance
standards or rate-based trading. See Stavins (2003) for an extensive account of various programmes.
2Kerr and Newell (2003) empirically assess the performance of credit trading in the U.S. lead phase down
programme and found that this type of allowance trading provided signicant incentives for reneries to adopt
cost-e¤ective technologies.
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in the long run, is analyzed and compared such that the total long run level of emissions
under both schemes is the same. The latter ensures a fair comparison of the two schemes
and at the same time makes the analysis more tractable.
Four main insights emerge from our analysis. First, in the long run, credit trading un-
ambiguously provides a greater proportion of clean rms compared to permit trading for
all binding pollution targets. Second, the long run equilibrium proportion of rms in the
clean sector is suboptimal under both emissions trading schemes: the share of clean rms
is typically too high under credit trading, whereas permit trading results in too few clean
rms. Third, permit trading generally dominates credit trading in terms of overall welfare
in the long run, except for the case when policy is relatively lenient. Fourth, although more
stringent environmental policy is often a driver behind an expansion of clean output relative
to dirty output, we show that the relative growth of the clean sector in the economy is not
guaranteed under permit trading when the cap on emissions is tightened. Indeed, it may not
even be optimal for the clean sector to grow relative to the dirty sector.
Previous studies that compare emissions trading on the basis of absolute and relative
targets with each other have ignored the multi-sectoral implications under imperfect compe-
tition. Dewees (2001) makes a welfare comparison between the two emissions trading schemes
in a single perfectly competitive industry, whereas Boom and Dijkstra (2009) make the com-
parison for a perfectly as well as an imperfectly competitive sector. Fischer (2003) analyzes
emission trading between two perfectly competitive sectors, one of them regulated by a per-
mit scheme and the other by a credit scheme. Boom and Dijkstra (2009) analyze the same
scenario for two perfectly competitive and two imperfectly competitive sectors.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. Section 3
discusses how emissions trading a¤ects the sectoral output mix in the short run. Given the
output and prot dynamics in the short run, Section 4 turns to a discussion of the long run
equilibria under the two emissions trading schemes. In Section 5 we derive the long run
welfare optima and compare the welfare e¤ects of permit and credit trading. Concluding
remarks are given in Section 6.
2 The model
Below we rst present the basic model (Section 2.1). Then we present the unconstrained
benchmark, reecting the long run equilibrium without environmental policy (Section 2.2).
This is followed by the formalization and functioning of the two emissions trading schemes
(Section 2.3). We conclude with the derivation of the short run equilibria in both the output
and pollution market (Section 2.4).
2.1 Basic elements
Consider two imperfectly competitive markets consisting of a total of n  2 rms that choose
output to maximize prot. Each rm faces two decisions: (1) a long run decision between
producing in the clean sector (i = c) or the dirty sector (i = d); and (2) the short run output
decision given the choice of sector. Each rm f = 1; : : : ; n chooses output, taking as given
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the number of rms in each sector. Given the sector in which a rm is operating, rm-level
emissions ei > 0 are assumed to vary proportionally with rm-level output qi > 0 for both
goods:
ei = iqi: i = c; d: (1)
By denition, emissions per unit of output are lower for the clean good, i.e., c < d.
Dene the variable s 2 [0; 1] as the fraction of rms in the clean sector. The number of
clean rms nc and dirty rms nd is then given by:
nc  sn nd  (1  s)n: (2)
Aggregate output produced by rms in the clean and dirty sector is simplyQi = niqi (i = c; d).
The two sectors face the following inverse demand functions:
pi = i  Qi; i = c; d (3)
where pi is the price of good i and Qi is the aggregate output supplied by the rms that
compete in sector i. A higher i (relative to  i) implies an absolute advantage in demand
(at equal output levels) enjoyed by the rm in sector i (e.g., Dixit, 1979). Put di¤erently,
i    i reects a price premium for sector i.
Fixed costs are normalized to zero since they do not a¤ect the output decision at the
margin.3 Both sectors exhibit constant returns to scale (i.e., they are linearly homogenous),
implying constant marginal cost ci > 0. Total production costs Ci are then proportional to
output:
Ci = ciqi; i = c; d (4)
Following Dixit (1979), the cost margin for a rm in sector i is dened as i  i   ci > 0;
and a rm in sector i has a margin advantage if i >  i:
2.2 The unconstrained benchmark
We rst determine the unconstrained benchmark, i.e., the long run equilibrium without en-
vironmental policy. In this case the rms prot (i) maximization problem is simply:
max
qi
i = (pi   ci)qi; i = c; d: (5)
The unconstrained Cournot-Nash quantities are then accordingly:
qi(s) =
i
ni(s) + 1
i = c; d; (6)
with ni(s) given by (2). Given linear demand and constant marginal cost, prots can be
written as:
i(s) = [qi(s)]
2 =

i
ni(s) + 1
2
i = c; d: (7)
3Positive but homogeneous xed costs for the di¤erent sectors do not a¤ect the model, other than reducing
prot levels. Heterogeneous xed costs shift the long run equilibrium towards the sector with the lower xed
cost, but otherwise the results are qualitatively unchanged.
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In the unconstrained equilibrium rms are indi¤erent between the two sectors in terms of
protability, so that c(s) = d(s): From (7) this directly implies that qd(s) = qc(s): Using
(6), solving this equality for s yields the following unconstrained equilibrium:
s =
c(n+ 1)  d
n(c + d)
: (8)
An unconstrained interior equilibrium 0 < s < 1; is obtained for all parameters such that:
d
n+ 1
< c < d(n+ 1): (9)
When (9) holds there are rms in both the clean and dirty sectors, even in the absence of envi-
ronmental policy. Substituting (8) into (6), the Cournot-Nash quantities at the unconstrained
equilibrium read:
qc = q

d = q
  c + d
n+ 2
: (10)
Next we examine how rms respond to a change in production costs, which can be brought
about by environmental policy (to be discussed in Section 3). Using (6), in the unconstrained
equilibrium s; the response of a rm in sector i to a change in production costs ci is:
dqi
dci
=  dqi
di
=   1
ni(s) + 1
=   q

i
; (11)
with q given by (10). For illustration, suppose that i >  i, that is sector i has a margin
advantage over sector  i: Then the reduction in output (and hence prot) for a rm in sector
i is smallest. This is because in the unconstrained equilibrium there are more rms in sector
i than in sector  i, as is clear from setting qc = qd in (6). An increase in the marginal cost,
ci, will prompt a rm in sector i to reduce its output, but this reduction is cushioned by the
fact that all the other competitors also reduce output, thereby raising the output price. In
sector  i the competitive pressure is less due to fewer number of rms, which provides each
rm with less of a cushion and forces it to cut back output further.
As we shall see more formally in Section 3, at any long run equilibrium with prots
equalized across sectors it holds that qc = qd = q
; so that aggregate emissions are:
E = csnqc + d(1  s)nqd = n (cs + d(1  s)) q: (12)
Substituting (8) and (10), aggregate emissions in the unconstrained benchmark are:
E =
n (cc + dd) + (d   c) (d   c)
n+ 2
: (13)
2.3 Formalizing emissions trading
Considering the two distinguished emissions trading schemes, denote emissions trading on
the basis of an absolute cap on aggregate pollution by A and emissions trading on the basis
of pollution intensities by I. As stated earlier, we refer to the former as permit trading and
the latter as credit trading in what follows.
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Given an absolute cap, L; under permit trading, rms sell (buy) permits when their
emissions ei are less than (exceed) their permit endowment, ei. Permits are sold at price v
and the rms prot maximization problem in sector i is:
max
ei
iA = (pi   ci)qi + v (ei   ei) i = c; d: (14)
The cap is non-binding if it is greater or equal to the unconstrained level of emissions given
by equation (13), i.e., L  E: A non-binding cap on pollution will result in a permit price
v = 0. A cap L < E is binding with a permit price v > 0; ensuring that the demand for
permits is equal to its supply: X
i=c;d
iniqi = L i = c; d: (15)
When rms move from the dirty to the clean sector, aggregate clean sector output Qc = ncqc
rises and permit demand by the clean sector increases. This induces the permit price to go
up causing total dirty sector output Qd and permit demand by the dirty sector to fall, so
that total permit demand again equals the xed supply L:
In contrast to a permit system, under a tradable credit scheme the government sets an
economy-wide pollution intensity standard, denoted . If a rm wants to emit more than the
standard allows, it can buy credits from rms that emit less than the standard allows. Thus,
clean rms always sell, and dirty rms always buy credits. The result is that on average
the economy as a whole complies with the emission standard but the individual rm has the
exibility to deviate from it. Alternatively, the emission standard can be seen as a weighted
average of the emission intensities:
 = xc + (1  x)d s  x  1: (16)
From (12) and (16) it is clear that x = s in the long run equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium
proportion of clean rms always coincides with the weighted average of the sectorsemission
intensities. A weighted average x at or below the unconstrained level s; given in (8), is
non-binding and will result in a credit price w = 0; a weighted average x > s is binding
and will result in w > 0: The upper-bound weight x = 1 implies a policy where the standard
solely reects the emissions intensity of the clean sector. Setting x = 1 implies  = c; hence
inducing the elimination of the dirty sector.
Under the credit trading scheme a rms prot maximization problem is:
max
ei
iI = (pi   ci)qi + w (qi   ei) i = c; d (17)
and the credit market clears via the constraint:
ndqd(   d) = ncqc(c   ): (18)
This constraint reveals the key di¤erence in the functioning of the permit and credit market.
Whereas the supply of allowances (L) is xed under the permit regime, the supply of credits
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 the RHS of (18)  varies with aggregate clean output Qc = ncqc: When rms move from
the dirty to the clean sector (nd declines and nc rises) and Qc = ncqc rises, the supply of
credits from rms in the clean sector increases. This results in a fall of the credit price so
that total production Qd and credit demand by rms in the dirty sector rises. In contrast,
when aggregate output of the clean sector Qc rises under permit trading, the permit price
also rises and aggregate output of the dirty sector Qd falls.
Note that while we consider imperfect competition in the output market, it is assumed
that rms act as price takers in the emissions market. Although this may seem restrictive,
it is, however, a credible assumption and not in conict with the imperfectly competitive
nature of the output market. For instance, the EU ETS for carbon emissions allows trade
between power generating rms, steel producers, glass manufacturers as well as rms from
the paper and cement industry. As a consequence, the pollution market can be competitive
while competition in the respective output markets is imperfect.
2.4 Short run equilibrium in the output and pollution market
In the short run a rms choice of sector is given under each trading scheme. We can then solve
the rms prot maximization optimization problems (14) and (17) as follows. Substituting
(1) and (3) into the prot function (14) under permit trading, the rst-order condition for a
rm in sector i is (derivation in Appendix):
1
i

i   ei(ni + 1)
i

= v(s; L) i = c; d: (19)
The LHS of (19) is the marginal revenue per unit of pollution and the RHS is the marginal
cost, i.e., permit price. The optimal short run Cournot-Nash equilibrium output levels are:
qi(s; L) =
i   iv(s; L)
ni(s) + 1
i = c; d: (20)
Using (20), rm prot under the permit trading scheme simplies to (see Appendix):
iA(s; L) = [qiA(s; L)]
2 + vei =

i   iv(s; L)
ni + 1
2
+ vei: (21)
There is a given distribution of clean and dirty rms, thus s is xed in the short run. The
equilibrium permit price v is obtained by substituting (20) into (15), yielding:
v(s; L) =
nscc [n (1  s) + 1] + ndd (ns+ 1) (1  s)  L

s (1  s)n2 + n+ 1
ns (n (1  s) + 1) 2c + n (ns+ 1) (1  s) 2d
: (22)
Substituting (22) into (20) generates the following short run equilibrium output level
qiA(s; L) =
Li (1 + n i) + n i i (i i    ii)
ni (n i + 1) 2i + n i (ni + 1) 
2
 i
:
Similarly for the credit trading scheme, substitution of (1) and (3) into the prot func-
tion (17) yields the following rst-order condition of a rm in sector i = c; d (derivation in
Appendix):
1
i

i   ei (ni + 1)
i

=  w(   i)
i
i = c; d; (23)
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which yields Cournot-Nash outputs:
qiI(s; ) =
i + w(   i)
ni + 1
i = c; d: (24)
Firm-level prot under the credit scheme then becomes (see Appendix):
iI(s; ) = [qiI(s; )]
2 =

i + (   i)w(s; )
ni + 1
2
: (25)
The corresponding price for tradable credits is found by substituting (24) into the credit
market equilibrium condition (18), yielding:
w(s; ) =
sc(nd + 1)(c   ) + (1  s)d(nc + 1)(d   )
s(nd + 1)(c   )2 + (1  s)(nc + 1)(d   )2 : (26)
Substituting (26) into (24) one obtains:
qc(s; ) = nd(d   ); qd(s; ) = nc(   c); (27)
where   d(c )+c( d)
nc(nd+1)(c )2+nd(nc+1)(d )2 > 0; implying qc and qd are always positive under
credit trading.
By building upon the short run output quantities, in the next section we will concentrate
on the sectoral dynamics and examine the emissions trading properties under both schemes.
Once this platform is established we can determine and assess the long run equilibrium
outcome.
3 Sectoral dynamics and emissions trading
In the long run equilibrium, not only are the output and pollution market in equilibrium but
rms are also indi¤erent switching between producing in the clean and the dirty sector. We
introduce environmental policy at the unconstrained equilibrium, as described in subsection
2.2. The strictness of environmental policy  the cap L under permit trading and the
emission standard  under credit trading  is set at its long run target. Firms adjust their
output levels immediately, but only gradually start moving toward the sector that would
yield them higher prots. This gradual adjustment process continues until prots are equated
across sectors in the long run equilibrium.4 We will now provide some comparative statics
for the emissions trading mechanism in relation to this adjustment process under both types
of trading schemes.
Permit trading, with a total of L permits issued, is introduced in the unconstrained
equilibrium with s = s given by (8) and qc = qd = q
 given by (10). Combining these with
(20), we can write output under permit trading at s = s as:
qi(s
; L) = q

1  i
i
v(s; L)

;
4See, e.g., Witt (1997) for a general justication of such an adjustment process.
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and we see that
@qi(s
; L)
@v
= i
dqi
dci
=   q

i
  iq

i
:
The permit price v translates into production costs of iv: Thus, a marginal increase in v
has the same e¤ect as i times an increase in the marginal cost, ci: We know from (11) that
the reduction in output qi due to an increase in ci is inversely related to a rms cost margin
advantage on output, i: That is, a rising permit price reduces output and prot in both
sectors but less so in the sector with the highest i=i ratio. While i is the cost margin on
output, we call i  i=i the cost margin on emissions.
Starting from the unconstrained equilibrium, rms will start moving to the sector with
the highest cost margin on emissions where, by (21), output per rm and prot is higher.
Note, however, that environmental policy in the form of permit trading does not necessarily
lead to more clean rms. It only induces more clean rms if c is larger (or not too much
smaller) than d: However, for c << d we have d > c; implying rms move from the clean
to the dirty sector. From (22), the sign of the permit price change over time is the sign of:
@v(s; L)=@s
c   d
=
n2c
2
d(n+ 1  2ns(1  s))  b(s)L
n

s (n (1  s) + 1) 2c + (ns+ 1) (1  s) 2d
2 : (28)
The rst term in the numerator on the RHS is positive. The second term is also positive with
b(s)  (ns+1)22d (n(1 s)+1)
22c
c d > 0 and increasing over time. In the unconstrained equilibrium
benchmark we obtain
b(s) = (c + d)

cd (n+ 2)
c + d
2
: (29)
Approaching the new long-run equilibrium with sA clean rms, as given in Table 1, we nd
from (28) that:
@v(sA; L)=@s
c   d
=   cd
n

(n [1  s] + 1) s2c + (ns+ 1) (1  s) 2d
2 < 0: (30)
Thus the permit price will be declining in the end, toward the new equilibrium. This means
that towards the end, the second term in the numerator on the RHS of (28) dominates the
rst term. With the second term increasing over time along with b(s), the permit price will
initially be decreasing over time when L is large and increasing when L is small.
Next, let us turn to credit trading. The emission standard  is introduced at the uncon-
strained equilibrium with s = s given by (8) and qc = qd = q
 given by (10). Combining
these equations with (24) we can write output under credit trading at s = s as:
qi(s
; ) = q

1 +
w(   i)
i

i = c; d:
As a result of the imposed policy, producing an extra unit of dirty output now carries an extra
cost of w( d), i.e., an extra unit of production yields  extra credits but d extra pollution.
Thus, the rm is  d credits short, which it has to buy at price w: Conversely, production of
the clean good is subsidizedat rate w(  c); because extra production yields more credits
than the clean rm needs. This implies that under a credit trading regime the production of
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the clean good rises above the unconstrained equilibrium level q and production of the dirty
good falls below it.
Starting from the unconstrained equilibrium, rms will start moving to the clean sector
where output per rm and prots are higher, by (25). As expected, as the number of clean
rms increases over time, we see from (26) that the credit price decreases:
@w(s; )
@s
=
  [n  2s(1  s)n+ 1] (   c)(d   )[c(d   ) + d(   c)]
[s((1  s)n+ 1)(   c)2 + (1  s)(sn+ 1)(   d)2]2
< 0; (31)
while from equation (24) the changes in dirty and clean production per rm are given by:5
@qi(s; )
@s
=
@w
@s (   i)(ni + 1)  dnids [i + w(   i)]
(ni + 1)2
i = c; d:
The rms adjustment unfolds as explained in Section 2.3 following (18). As more and more
rms switch to the clean sector (s increases), the supply of credits by clean rms rises [the
RHS of (18)]. This depresses the credit price (@w=@s < 0); allowing the remaining rms in
the dirty sector to increase their output (@qd=@s > 0) and their demand for credits [the LHS
of (18)]. Finally, output per clean rm decreases (@qc=@s < 0) both because rms enter the
clean sector and because the credit price falls.
Recall that at the unconstrained equilibrium s (our point of departure) the output level
per rm and prot is higher in the clean sector once regulation in the form of emissions
trading is imposed. This attracts rms to the clean sector, which in turn reduces output per
rm and prot in this sector. Prot in the dirty sector increases as rms exit the dirty sector
and enter the clean sector. This process reduces the prot di¤erential as more rms switch to
the clean sector until prot is equated in the long run equilibrium. Now that we understand
the functioning behind the intersectoral adjustment dynamics, we will make the step towards
examining the corresponding long run equilibrium under the two emissions trading schemes
in greater detail.
4 Long run equilibrium
In the long run equilibrium rms have no incentive to switch sectors since all rms earn
the same prot, i.e., ck = dk (k = A; I). Given prots as expressed by (21) and (25),
one can straightforwardly solve c = d for s under both trading schemes, yielding the long
run equilibrium proportion sk of rms in the clean sector. Table 1 contains these long run
equilibria for both emissions trading schemes as well as the associated equilibrium values of
other key variables.
4.1 Reaching a target level of emissions under permit and credit trading
Suppose the regulator wishes to achieve a certain level of emissions E = EA = E

I in the
long run equilibrium. Under permit trading the regulator can simply issue a total number
5We know from (31) that @w=@s < 0 and from (24) and (27) that i + w(   i) > 0 for i = c; d: Then
@qc=@s < 0 because  c < 0 and dnc=ds = n > 0; while @qd=@s > 0 because  d < 0 and dnd=ds =  n < 0:
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Table 1: Long run equilibrium values
Permit trading Credit trading
Clean sector size sA =
nd[cd dc]+L[c(n+1) d]
n[(cd dc)(d c)+L(c+d)] s

I =
d 
d c = x
Firm output qc = qd =
cd(d c) dc(d c)+L(d+c)
n(2c+
2
d)+(d c)2
qc = qd =
xc+(1 x)d
2nx(x 1)+n+1
Agg. clean output Qc =
nd[cd dc]+L[c(n+1) d]
n(2c+
2
d)+(d c)2
Qc =
nx[xc+(1 x)d]
2nx(x 1)+n+1
Agg. dirty output Qd =
nc[dc cd]+L[d(n+1) c]
n(2c+
2
d)+(d c)2
Qd =
n(1 x)[xc+(1 x)d]
2nx(x 1)+n+1
Allowance price v = c[c(n+1) d]+d[d(n+1) c] L(n+2)
n(2c+
2
d)+(d c)2
w = d(nx+1) c[n(1 x)+1](d c)(2nx(x 1)+n+1)
Emissions EA = L E

I =
n[(xc+(1 x)d)][xc+(1 x)d)]
2nx(x 1)+n+1
of permits that corresponds to the aggregate emissions target, such that L = EA: However,
under credit trading it is not directly clear how to reach E = EI : We see from Table 1 that
there are usually two levels of the weighted average of the emissions intensity of the clean
and dirty good that yield the same EI :
x =
n (2EI + cd + dc   2dd)
p
na
2n
 
2EI + (c   d) (d   c)
 ; (32)
where a   4EI (2EI + (c   d) (d   c)) + 4EIn (cc + dd   EI ) + n (cd   ndc)2 :
Using the unconstrained emissions E as shown by (13), this can be rewritten such that the
relevant root becomes:6
x =
1
2
+
(n+ 2)

n (cc   dd) +
q
n2 (cd   dc)2   4EIn(n+ 2)(EI   E)

2n
 
2(n+ 2)(EI   E) + n (c + d) (c + d)
 : (33)
From Table 1 we know that x equals the long run equilibrium under credit trading in (32).
In the Appendix we prove the following:
Proposition 1 Under credit trading, if the clean sector has the highest cost margin on emis-
sions (c > d); then the long run equilibrium proportion of rms in the clean sector, s

I ;
increases continuously from the unconstrained equilibrium s as the aggregate emission level
EI is reduced from the unconstrained level E
: If the dirty sector has the highest cost margin
on emissions (d > c); then s

I jumps up initially as E

I is reduced from E
; after which it
increases continuously.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this proposition. In Figure 1, the clean sector has the highest
cost margin on emissions (c > d); so that s

I increases continuously from its unconstrained
6See appendix for the identication of this root.
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value of 0.317 as aggregate emissions are reduced from their unconstrained level of 8.07. In
Figure 2, the dirty sector faces the highest cost margin on emissions (d > c); so that as
soon as emissions are reduced from their unconstrained level of 3.97, sI jumps up from 0.317
to 0.365. From there it increases continuously as aggregate emissions are reduced further.
0.4
0.32
8.11.2 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
s*I
s*A
sA
~
s^
E
s
Figure 1: Long run equilibrium values when the clean good has the highest cost margin on
emissions (n = 20; c = 5; d = 10; c = 14 ; d =
3
4)
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Figure 2: Long run equilibrium values when the dirty good has the highest cost margin on
emissions (n = 20; c = 5; d = 10; c = 15 ; d =
1
3)
4.2 Environmental stringency and impact on the long run equilibrium
In this section we examine the e¤ect of stricter environmental policy on the size of the clean
sector at the long run equilibrium. Using the equilibrium given in Table 1, with permit
12
trading we get:
@sA
@L
=
(d   c)cd(2ncd + (n+ 1)(c   d)2)
n[(c   d) (d   c) cd + L (c + d)]2
: (34)
The sign, which depends on the rst term in brackets in the numerator, is in line with our
analysis in Section 3. When the clean (dirty) sector has the highest cost margin on emissions
[i.e., c > (<) d] and permit trading is introduced in the unconstrained equilibrium, rms
will start moving towards the clean (dirty) sector and there will ultimately be more (fewer)
clean rms in the long run equilibrium the stricter is the cap on pollution.
Proposition 2 With permit trading, if the clean sector has the highest cost margin on emis-
sions (c > d); then the long run equilibrium proportion of rms in the clean sector, s

A; is
increasing in the strictness of environmental policy (lower cap L) and above the unconstrained
level s: If the dirty sector has the highest cost margin on emissions (d > c); then sA is
decreasing in the strictness of environmental policy and even below s:
This proposition is also illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, the clean good has the
highest cost margin on emissions (c > d); so that s

A increases as aggregate emissions are
reduced. In Figure 2, the dirty good has the highest cost margin on emissions (d > c); so
that sA decreases as aggregate emissions are reduced.
We now turn to a comparison of the long run equilibria.
Proposition 3 Credit trading results in a strictly larger clean sector compared to permit
trading for any binding cap on pollution. That is, sI > s

A for all E
 below the unconstrained
emission level E given by (13).
Proof. In Table 1, substituting x = sA into E

I and subtracting L yields:
EI jx=sA   L =
( E   L)(n+ 2)
L2(n+ 2) + n (cd   dc)2
> 0
Thus, issuing L permits under permit trading leads to sA; and imposing this s

A as a standard
under credit trading would lead to higher emissions than L: Since dEI =ds

I < 0 from Propo-
sition 1; reaching an emission level of L requires a stricter standard than sA, i.e., s

I > s

A:
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is the following. Under the permit trading scheme each
rm is endowed with a commodity, i.e., the permit. For a given the distribution of rms
in the clean and dirty sector (the state s), both clean and dirty rms can potentially sell
permits depending on the prot opportunities. Firms utilize the permit as they produce
output, which they then sell for a prot. The permit price is essentially the shadow value of
prot for a given level of s. Put di¤erently, producing a unit of output has an opportunity
cost in terms of the lost permit revenue that could have been earned in the permit market.
In contrast, under emissions trading based on intensity targets only clean rms can supply
the commodity, i.e., the credit. The credit can only be created by producing a unit of
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clean output. Therefore, under a credit trading scheme rms in the clean sector have a
negative opportunity cost of production. Compared to permit trading a clean rm now has
two market sources of revenue from producing a unit of output: the output market and the
credit market. Thus, under permit trading clean rms exercise allowances (the permits) as
they produce output whereas under credit trading they create allowances (the credits) as
they produce output. This implies that credits are similar to providing clean rms with an
implicit output subsidy equal to the credit revenue per unit of output (Dewees, 2001; Fischer,
2003), which provides an extra incentive to switch to become a clean rm in the long run.
Under a permit scheme all emissions imply a permit cost whereas under credit trading only
dirty-rm emissions implies a cost. Under a credit scheme clean rm emissions produce credit
revenue.
5 Welfare
In this section we will determine the welfare optimum for a given level of emissions E in
the long run equilibrium where rmsprot is equalized between the clean and dirty sector.
We then compare the welfare optimum to the long run equilibrium under permit and credit
trading, followed by a comparison of welfare under credit and permit trading.
Welfare consists of consumer surplus, net producer surplus and the value of permits,
minus environmental damage. Since we are comparing permit and credit trading for a given
equal level of emissions in the long run equilibrium, environmental damage is the same in
what follows. This means we can abstract from including environmental damage explicitly,
hence making the analysis more transparent. We dene net producer surplus as the rms
prots after paying for the emission allowances. With permit trading this is the rst term
on the RHS of (21); with credit trading it simply equals the rms prots iI in (25). The
value of permits, vei in (21), is also a part of the rms prots if they are grandfathered to
rms. In case the permits would be auctioned, the value would accrue to the government. In
graphical terms, welfare W consists of the area between the demand curves i  Qi and the
marginal cost curves ci (i = c; d); or formally:
W = cQc + dQd   1
2
(Q2c +Q
2
d)
= cnsqc + dn(1  s)qd   (nsqc)
2 + (n(1  s)qd)2
2
: (35)
We will now compare welfare in the long run equilibria under permits and credits under
the restriction that total emissions do not exceed E = E as given in (12). Substituting this
expression into (35), we can express welfare as a function of s:
W =
csE
sc + (1  s)d +
d(1  s)E
sc + (1  s)d  
1
2
"
sE
sc + (1  s)d
2
+

(1  s)E
sc + (1  s)d
2#
:
(36)
Di¤erentiating (36) with respect to s and solving yields the following welfare-maximizing size
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of the clean sector:
s^ =
Ec + (c   d) c2d
E (c + d) + (c   d) (d   c) cd
: (37)
Di¤erentiating (37) with respect to E one obtains:
ds^
dE
=
(d   c)
 
2c + 
2
d

cd
[E (c + d) + (c   d) (d   c) cd]2
: (38)
When emissions E decrease, the optimal size of the clean sector s^ increases (decreases) if the
clean (dirty) good has the highest cost margin on emissions, i.e., c > (<) d: Intuitively, in
the welfare maximum the welfare margin on emissions  i.e., the welfare increase from an
increase in emissions  is the same in both sectors, implying (pc   cc)="c = (pd   cd)="d,
or writing out, c   sq"c = d  
(1 s)q
"d
= !: A decrease in overall emissions would prompt a
decrease in output, q: Keeping the size of the clean sector s constant, this decrease in pollution
would raise the welfare margin on emissions in the clean sector by s="c = (c   !)=q and in
the dirty sector by (1  s)="d = (d !)=q:When d > c the welfare margin would increase
more in the dirty sector and would hence be higher in the dirty sector. To restore equality
of welfare margins, rms would have to move from the clean to the dirty sector. Thus when
d > c; the size of the clean sector decreases when aggregate emissions go down. Conversely,
when c > d; the size of the clean sector increases when emissions decrease.
Comparing (38) with (34), we see that the welfare maximizing size of the clean sector s^
and the long run size of the clean sector under permit trading sA move in the same direction
as emissions E decrease. Comparing the optimal s^ in (37) with the equilibrium sA under
permits in Table 1, we obtain:
sA   s^ =  
L(d   c)
n [E (c + d) + (c   d) (d   c) cd]
< 0: (39)
The term in square brackets on the RHS is clearly positive for c > d: For d > c; since
the term is increasing in E; its lowest value is found for the minimum value of E; which is
where s^ = 1 in (37). Thus we nd that for d > c the term in square brackets on the RHS
of (39) exceeds (d   c)
 
2c + 
2
d

c > 0.
We see that sA < s^ for nite market size n; s

A ! s^ if n!1, i.e., under perfect compe-
tition permit trading would implement the rst-best outcome. Under imperfect competition
production per rm is too low. By (12) this means that production is, on average, too dirty
and the proportion of rms in the clean sector is too low. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that
while the optimal s^ moves in the same direction as sA under permit trading, s^ always exceeds
sA for a given level of emissions. In sum:
Proposition 4 1. When the clean (dirty) sector has the highest cost margin on emissions
[i.e., c > (<) d]; the long run welfare maximizing size of the clean sector, s^; increases
(decreases) continuously as E is reduced from the long run unconstrained equilibrium
emissions level E.
2. While the long run equilibrium under permit trading sA moves in the same direction as
the welfare optimum s^ when E changes, sA < s^ for any given level of E
:
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Turning to the comparison with credit trading and the welfare-maximizing s^; let us start
with the case where the clean good has the highest cost margin on emissions (c > d); which
means that the long run equilibrium sI as well as the welfare-maximizing s^ are decreasing in
emissions E: Under credit trading the proportion of clean rms at the unconstrained emission
level E is sI( E
) = sA( E
) = s < s^( E) by (39). That is, for a very high level of emissions;
close to E; the clean sector is too small. As emissions decrease both sI and s^ rise, but the
former rises faster, so that sI = s^ occurs at a unique value of emissions E 2
 
0; E

: For
lower values of emissions sI > s^: This is illustrated in Figure 1, where s

I < s^ for E between
8.01 and 8.07 and sI > s^ for all E < 8:01.
When the dirty sector has the highest cost margin on emissions (d > c); the welfare-
maximizing value of s^ decreases from s^( E) > s when emissions are reduced, but sI rst
jumps up and then increases continuously when E is reduced. From (13), (33) and (37) we
see that just below E, sI exceeds s^ if and only if:
2n
 
d
2
c   c2d

(c + d) + n
2 (d   c)
 
2d   2c

cd > (n+ 1) (c + d) (d   c)3
This condition is satised if and only if:
n > n^ 
q 
2c + 
2
d
2
Z2 + 4cd (d   c)
 
2d   2c

(c + d) (d   c)3   Z
 
2c + 
2
d

2cd (d   c)
 
2d   2c
 (40)
with Z  cc   3cd + 3dc   dd: Since sI is decreasing and s^ is increasing in emissions
E; sI > s^ for all E  E if n > n^. This is the case in Figure 2, where s^ = 0:329 at E = E;
but sI jumps up to 0.365 when E is reduced from E
: If n < n^ then sI < s^ for very high E
(close to E): With sI decreasing and s^ increasing in E, s

I = s^ occurs at a unique value of
E 2  0; E : For lower values of E; sI > s^. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 5 1. When the clean sector has the highest cost margin on emissions (c >
d); the long run equilibrium under credit trading s

I is below the optimal size of the
clean sector s^ for very high E close to E; but above optimal for all other E:
2. When the dirty sector has the highest cost margin on emissions (d > c); s

I exceeds s^
for all E if n > n^, with n^ dened by (40). If n < n^ then sI is below s^ for very high
E close to E; but exceeds s^ for all other E:
Let us now compare welfare with permits and credits at the long run equilibrium. We
know that there are too few clean rms under permits and there are more clean rms under
credits than permits. Thus, when there are too few clean rms under credits, welfare is
higher under credits (because sA < s

I < s^). However, when there are too many clean rms
under credits, there may be so many that welfare is lower than under permits. To push the
analysis a bit further it is useful to dene ~sA > s^ as the proportion of clean rms that yields
the same welfare level as sA < s^: Welfare under credits is higher (lower) than under permits
if sI < (>) ~sA: From Table 1 and (36) we nd:
~sA =
E
 
(1 + n)3c + 
3
d + (1 + n)c
2
d   32cd

+ (c   d) dz
E((2 + n)
 
3c + 
3
d

+ (n  2)cd (c + d)) + (c   d) (d   c) z
; (41)
16
with z  cd[2 (d   c)2 + n
 
2c + 
2
d

]: Following sA and s^; ~sA is decreasing (increasing) in
emissions for c > (<) d, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
Let us start with the case where the clean good has the highest cost margin on emissions
(c > d): With credit trading the equilibrium at the laissez-faire level E
 is sI( E
) =
sA( E
) = s < s^( E) < ~sA
 
E

: Both sI and ~sA rise as emissions go down, but the former
rises faster so that sI = ~sA occurs at a unique value of E 2
 
0; E

. For lower values of E; sI >
~sA. In this case, credits lead to higher welfare than permits for very lenient environmental
policy (E between 7.92 and 8.07 in Figure 1), but to lower welfare for stricter policy. When
the dirty good has the highest cost margin on emissions (d > c); then from equations (13),
(33) and (41), sI just below E
 exceeds ~sA if and only if:
n2 (d   c)
 
2c + 
2
d

cd + 2n ((c + d) d1 + dd2) > 2d3 (c + d) ;
with d1  3c + 22cd + c2d   23d; d2  3c + 2cd + c2d + 3d and d3  3d + 2dc   d2c   3c :
This inequality holds if and only if:
n > ~n 
q
((c + d) d1 + dd2)
2 + 2 (d   c)
 
2c + 
2
d

cdd3 (c + d)  (c + d) d1   dd2
(d   c)
 
2c + 
2
d

cd
(42)
Since sI is decreasing and ~sA is increasing in E; s

I > ~sA for all E  E if n > ~n: In this
case, permit trading leads to higher welfare than credit trading. This is the case in Figure
2, where ~sA = 0:342 at E = E; but sI jumps up to 0.365 when E is reduced from E
: If
n < ~n, sI < ~sA for very high E: With s

I decreasing and s^ increasing in E; so that s

I = ~sA
occurs at a unique value of E 2  0; E : For lower values of aggregate emissions sI > ~sA: In
this case, credits lead to higher welfare than permits for very lenient environmental policy,
but to lower welfare for stricter policy.
Proposition 6 1. When the clean sector has the highest cost margin on emissions (c >
d); long run welfare is higher under credit trading than under permit trading for very
high E close to E; but permit trading leads to higher welfare for all other E:
2. When the dirty sector has the highest cost margin on emissions (d > c); long run
welfare is higher with permit trading for all E if n > ~n; with ~n given by (42). If n < ~n,
long run welfare is higher with credit trading for very high E close to E; but permit
trading leads to higher welfare for all other E:
Finally, let us compare the di¤erent welfare components  consumer surplus, net producer
surplus and the value of permits  for both emissions trading schemes. Obviously, the value
of permits is only relevant for permit trading. Given linear demand with slope normalized
to  1, consumer surplus for each type is (Qi)2 =2 (i = c; d), and aggregate consumer surplus
is then CS = (Qc)
2 =2 + (Qd)
2 =2. Dening CS = CSI   CSA as the consumer surplus
advantage of the credit trading scheme, solving CS = 0 for x one obtains:
Proposition 7 Credit trading results in strictly greater equilibrium consumer surplus com-
pared to permit trading for any binding cap on pollution.
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Proof. Dene CS = CSI   CSA as the consumer surplus advantage of the credit
trading scheme. Then, solving CS = 0 for x one obtains x = c(n+1) dn(c+d) and an irrelevant
root x = dd c ; which is strictly greater than one for all d > c > 0. Note from Table 1 that
the cap L = 0 implies this irrelevant root sA = x =
d
d c . If the cap is non-binding, the
equilibrium is where qcA = qdA () csn+1 = d(1 s)n+1 and the unconstrained equilibrium is:
sA = x =
c(n+1) d
n(c+d)
. Direct evaluation for all values of x > x shows that CS > 0:
The reason why consumer surplus is unambiguously higher under credit trading at the long
run equilibrium is the following. Producing output under a credit trading scheme creates a
credit, which can be sold. This tends to increase clean output and consequently consumer
surplus. With higher clean output, a greater supply of credits reduces the price, making dirty
production less expensive than when the clean sector is relatively small, i.e., when there are
only a few number of rms in the clean sector. The marginal cost of pollution is not fully
included in the nal output price because credits only impose a cost on those emissions that
exceed the baseline activity level (e.g., Dewees, 2001). By contrast, with permits every unit of
production and pollution implies a cost. Since the costs of pollution are lower under a credit
scheme, output prices also tend to be lower under credits compared to permits, resulting in
greater consumer surplus.
A similar line of argument can be followed to compare net producer surplus across both
emissions trading schemes. Total net producer surplus is PS = n(qi)2 since clean and dirty
rms have equal prot for a given regime in the long run equilibrium. The comparison reduces
to comparing quantities [see (21) and (25)] which gives us:
Proposition 8 Credit trading results in strictly greater equilibrium net producer surplus com-
pared to permit trading for any binding cap on pollution.
Proof. As before, dene PS = PSI   PSA as the net producer surplus advantage of
the credit trading scheme. Solving PS = 0 for x yields exactly the same relevant root x as
in (8).7 Direct evaluation shows PS > 0 8x > x:
Again, a tradable credit acts as an implicit subsidy to rms active in the clean sector. Since
credits can only be created by producing clean output, this increases the number of rms
in the clean sector. However, as the clean sector grows compared to the dirty sector, the
relative protability of rms in the dirty sector enhances due to less competitive pressure.
For a given regime where prots are equalized, anything that increases clean prots will also
increase dirty prots.
Comparing Propositions 7 and 8 to Proposition 6, we can conclude that while consumer
surplus and net producer surplus are higher under credit trading, the value of permits under
permit trading is so large that usually permits lead to higher overall welfare.
7The other root is the same one obtained earlier, i.e., x = d
d c : In addition, there are two imaginary roots
that have real portions greater than one and are thus outside the relevant range.
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6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes and compares the two main emissions trading design schemes  trading
on the basis of an absolute cap and trading on the basis of pollution intensities  in a two-
sector model with imperfect output competition. Firms choose output to maximize prot in
the short run, given they are in the clean or the dirty sector. In the long run, rms switch
sectors until prots are equalized. Given this framework, the analyses provides the following
insights.
First, imposing environmental policy through emissions trading on the basis of an absolute
cap (permit trading) does not automatically induce the clean sector to grow, as is often
presumed. We nd that a more stringent cap under permit trading induces a greater number
of rms to switch to the clean sector only when the clean sector has a higher cost margin on
emissions. In contrast, emissions trading on the basis of pollution intensities (credit trading)
unambiguously results in a strictly greater number of clean rms in the long run. Via the
use of emission standards, credit trading is e¤ective in expanding the clean sector even when
clean rms face a higher marginal cost relative to rms producing output in the dirty sector.
Second, while credit trading results in more clean rms than permit trading, it usually
leads to too many clean rms. The size of the clean sector under credit trading is usually
higher than the welfare-maximizing level. On the other hand, permit trading induces too
few rms to switch to the clean sector in the long run. However, permit trading leads to
higher long run welfare than credit trading, except when environmental policy is very lenient.
Indeed, when the dirty sector has the higher cost margin on emissions, and permit trading
leads to more dirty rms, it is welfare-maximizing to have more dirty rms.
While permit trading usually leads to higher overall welfare, consumers are better o¤
under credit trading, because output is higher and prices are lower compared to permit
trading. Producers, on the other hand, are better o¤under permit trading if there is complete
grandfathering; if permits were auctioned, producers would prefer credit trading. Partial
auctioning of permits and spending the revenue on compensating consumers might bring
consumers around to permit trading while still retaining the producerssupport. However,
political haggling and lobbying over the share of permits to be auctioned and over spending
the auction revenue may become very costly and distracting (e.g., MacKenzie and Ohndorf,
2011). Credit trading, where by default producers have the rights to emit (indeed, rms can
create them), avoids this problem.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of rst-order conditions (19) and (23)
Let us rst concentrate on (19). Using (1) and rewriting as qi = ei=i; prot is written as
a constrained optimization problem in rm-level emissions. For rm f = 1; : : : ; n of type
i = c; d; substituting (3) and (1) into the prot function (14) gives:
max
ei
fi = (i   qfi  
P
q fi )q
f
i + v(ei   efi ):
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Eliminating quantity and writing this in terms of emissions we have:
max
ei
fi =
efi
i
 
i   e
f
i
i
 P q fi
!
+ v(ei   efi ):
The rst order condition is:
1
i
 
i   2e
f
i
i
 P q fi
!
  v = 0;
which will be the same for any rm of type i, hence symmetry and simplication results in
(19). 
Next, the rst order condition for the credit trading scheme. Following the same proce-
dure, substitution of (3) and (1) into the prot function (17) gives:
max
ei
fi = (i   qfi  
P
q fi )q
f
i + w (iqi   ei) :
Again, eliminating quantity and writing this in terms of emissions we have:
max
ei
fi =
efi
i
 
i   e
f
i
i
 P q fi
!
+ w

iei
i
  ei

:
The rst order condition is:
1
i
 
i   2e
f
i
i
 P q fi
!
+ w

i   i
i

= 0;
which will be the same for any rm of type i, hence symmetry and simplication results in
(23). 
A.2 Derivation of prot functions (21) and (25)
Under permit trading prot is represented by (14). Using the demand function (3) and
emissions function (1), the prot function (14) becomes:
i = (i  Qi   ci)qi + v (ei   ei)
= (i  Qi)qi + v (ei   iqi)
= [i   vi   ni(s)qi]qi + vei:
Substituting the Cournot-Nash quantity (20) into the above expression gives (21):
i =
i   iv(s; L)
ni(s) + 1

i   vi   ni(s)i   iv(s; L)
ni(s) + 1

+ vei
= (qi(s; L))
2 + vei:

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Applying the same routine for the credit scheme, again using (3) and (1), the prot
function (17) becomes:
i = (i  Qi   ci)qi + w (qi   ei)
= (i  Qi)qi + w (qi   iqi)
= (i + w (   i)  ni(s)qi) qIi :
Substituting the Cournot-Nash quantity (24) into the above expression gives (25):
i =
i + w(   i)
ni + 1

i + w (   i)  ni(s)i + w(   i)
ni + 1

;
= (qi(s; ))
2:

A.3 Identication of the long run equilibrium (33)
Denote the two solutions for x in (32) by x0 and x1; with x0  x1:We see that for EI = E:
x0 =
(1 + n)c   d
n (c + d)
; x1 = s
 for c > d
x0 = s
; x1 =
(1 + n)c   d
n (c + d)
for c < d (43)
with s given by (8). It is clear from (33) that x1 is decreasing in EI ; because the numerator of
the fraction on the RHS is decreasing in EI and the denominator is increasing in E

I : It can also
be shown that x0 is increasing in EI : It follows from this and (43) that x

0 < s
 and x1 > s
for all EI < E
: This means that x0 cannot be implemented, because x0 requires a more
lenient standard than the unconstrained outcome and therefore not binding. However, x1
can be implemented, because it requires a stricter standard than the unconstrained outcome.
Thus sI = x

1 and equal to (33). 
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